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REGIONAL TAX BASE SHARING: POSSIBILITIES AND
IMPLICATIONS
ROY BAHL
and
DAVID PURYEAR

central cities, but the underlying economic
The real possibility that the continuing

New York City fiscal crisis fortells weaknesses
the fiscalthat are the root cause of New
fortunes of many other large central
York City's
citiescrisis afflict many other cities as

well.
The deterioration of the central city
underlines the need for a sweeping
reform
economic base, whether measured in terms
of the entire system of intergovernmental
relations in this country. What is of
needed
is income, is a widespread
jobs or
a serious reconsideration of the balance bephenomenon affecting some central cities
tween the tax base and public expenditure even more severely than New York City.1
needs at all levels of government; federal, The rapid inflation of recent years has restate, and local. The primary concern in this duced the net purchasing power of local
paper is with only one dimension of the governments substantially, increasing the
intergovernmental system - the relation- cost of the goods and services they utilize
ships among cities and their suburban local by more than it increases their revenue
governments. More specifically, the issues bases.2 The cost of public employee comraised here have to do with the efficiency pensation, especially fringe benefits, has
and equity implications of regional tax base risen rapidly in recent years,3 and finally,

sharing. Our basic conclusion is that re- the current national recession has reduced

gional solutions in their most likely form tax receipts of local governments while inwill do little to alleviate the urban fiscal

creasing pressures on their social service

problem. Only if the structure of regional
expenditures.4
tax and spending schemes is markedly There are essentially four alternatives for
changed will region alization improve thecities facing this fiscal dilemma. First, increased intergovernmental aid from either
fiscal position of cities without harming the
the federal or state level can be used to
real income of the urban poor.

Though our focus is solely on the in-relieve the financial squeeze. Second, the

traregional aspects of intergovernmental states or the federal government can asreform, we acknowledge that such reform
sume complete responsibility for some pubproposals can be properly evaluated only inlic functions, such as welfare. Third, city
a context of accompanying federal/state and
governments can raise their own taxes (if
state/local reforms. In this sense, our ap-permitted by the state). Finally, hardproach is very much a partial equilibriumpressed cities may be relieved to some extent by various forms of regionalization of
analysis.
taxes and/or expenditures, the subject of
In the following section we describe the
this paper.
possibilities and devices for regional financing. We turn then to an evaluation of their
1 Roy W. Bahl, Bernard Jump, and David Puryear,
"The Outlook for State and Local Government Fiscal
equity and efficiency implications. To the
Performance," Hearings on the Future of State and
extent there is a contribution here, it is to
Local Government Finances. Urban Affairs Subcomchallenge what we see as the conventional
mittee of the Joint Economic Committee, (Washington,
wisdom - that the major benefit of regional
D.C.: G.P.O.) forthcoming.
taxation, a capturing of the rich and grow2 David Greytak and Bernard Jump, The Effects of
Inflation on State and Local Government Finances,
1967-1971*, (Syracuse, N.Y.: Metropolitan Studies

ing suburban tax base, more than outweights all the disadvantages. What is

Program, Syracuse University) 1975.

argued here is that there are notable disad3 Roy W. Bahl and Bernard Jump, "The Budgetary
vantages of regionalization, which can be Implications of Rising Employee Retirement System
offset only by a proper structuring of the Costs," National Tax Journal, XXVII, (September,
1974).
financing mechanism.
4 Ralph Schlosstein, New York City's Financial

The fiscal problems of New York City

Crisis. Staff study for the Joint Economic Committee,

differ in degree from those of other large (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.) 1975.
328
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seven states and account for roughly ten
percent of municipal tax revenues nationThe two basic elements in regional
govwide.6
In eighteen states, cities levy special
ernance are the delivery of servicessales
and taxes,
the usually on alcohol, gasoline, or
tobacco.of
These special sales taxes account
financing of those services. The range
possibilities for metropolitan fiscal
for
reora slightly smaller share of municipal tax
ganization run from area wide general
receipts than general sales taxes. Only ten
government to areawide special purpose
states have cities with income or earnings
government to various forms of regional
taxes, but these taxes account for just over
ten percent
taxation.5 On the service delivery side,
the of all municipal tax revenues in
the
nation. This tax category includes taxes
crucial dimension is the geographic
extent
of the area served. On the financing
side
on the
income of residents (as in WashingD. C.) and on earnings of commuters (as
both the geographic area of the ton,
revenue
base and the nature of the base are crucial
in most other cities with an income tax).
The principal source of city tax revenues,
characteristics in defining a regional systhe property tax accounts for nearly twotem. Since our primary concern here is with
thirds of municipal tax revenues and is
revenues, we will cross-classify the available alternatives for regional financing levied
ac- by cities in all fifty states. Intergovernmental aid and user charges also provide
cording to these two elements of geographic
area and tax base.
revenues to cities in all fifty states. Each of
these two revenue sources accounts for
The alternatives for metropolitan fiscal
about
organization vary from no regionalization
to 20 percent of total municipal general
while taxes account for the recomplete metropolitan government.revenues,
The
60 percent.
geographic dimension of revenue basesmaining
can
The only regional element in this list of
be central city residents (the case of no recity taxes is the earnings tax on commuters,
gionalization), central city employees (some
and this type of tax accounts for a very
sharing of central city expenditure burdens
small share of city revenues.
with commuters), special district residents,
central county residents, or all residentsIn
of general, special districts are a step
greater regional responsibility. In
the region. The latter three categories toward
may
1972, more than half of all special district
coincide or overlap in some cases. The
major revenue base alternatives are inter- revenues were raised in districts overlying
II. FORMS OF REGIONALISM

governmental aid, retail sales, income, central cities of SMSA's. Special districts
property values, and user charges. Let us offer an incremental approach to regional
briefly identify these revenue sources indi- government. Furthermore, this pattern of
vidually before we turn to an evaluation of revenue sources varies somewhat with city
their economic implications. We begin with size. Large central cities rely somewhat
the case of no regionalization, where the more heavily on nonproperty taxes and
geographic area of the central city is the raise significantly more revenues per capita
from their own sources. For this reason,
statutory tax jurisdiction.
Various central cities levy taxes on gen- there has been considerably less opposition
eral retail sales, on specific retail sales, on to regionwide special purpose districts than
income, and on property values. They also to more sweeping regional reorganizations
receive revenues from higher levels of gov- and their numbers have been rising in reernment and from user charges. General cent years. Particularly in the area of mass
sales taxes are levied by cities in twenty- transit services, it has been possible to
combine areawide service delivery and fi5 For a general discussion of governmental organizanancing.
Regionwide general sales taxes
tion in metropolitan areas, see Alan K. Campbell
and

Judith Dollenmayer, "Governance in a Metropolitan
haveSobeen ušed to finance transportation
ciety," in Amos Hawley and Vincent Rock, eds.,some
Met- cases (Atlanta's MARTA and San

in

ropolitan America in Contemporary Perspective ,

(N.Y.: Halstead Press) 1975. For a discussion of a 6variThe following discussion draws on data from the

1972 Census of Governments, Vol. U, Government Fiety of nontax mechanisms for regional service delivery,
nances,
see Joseph Zimmerman, "Metropolitan Governance:
TheNo. Finances of Municipalities and Town-

ship Governments, (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.) 1974;
Intergovernmental Dimension," in Alan K. Campbell
and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relaand Roy W. B^hl, eds., State and Local Government:
tions,
Local Revenue Diversification, (Washington,
The Political Economy of Reform, (N.Y.: The
Free

Press) 1976.

D.C.: G.P.O.) 1974.
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Francisco's BART) andsevere,
there
been
large has
annexations
are frea rarity.10
quent use of region wide
property
taxation.
Given these
bleak prospects
for metropoliIn one case (Syracuse's CENTRO) the
tan government, we do not consider it as a
county mortgage tax is used to finance reviable option in the balance of this paper.
gional transportation. The other area where When most academics and practitioners
regional tax practices have been widelydiscuss regionalization of the tax base, the
preferred form is the shared areawide or at
used is education finance, usually levied on
a district or a countywide basis in property.
least countywide general purpose tax.
Other regionwise special purpose govern-There has been little or no experience with
ments tend to be financed by user charges.
general purpose regional income taxes, exCountywide taxes are also a step towards
cept for the local option surcharge on the
regionalization of the public sector. In genstate income tax as in Maryland. Regional
eral, counties rely more heavily on inter-property taxation for general purposes has
governmental aid and the property tax than
not been widely used, with the now well

cities. Nonproperty taxes accounted for
discussed Minneapolis program a notable

only 6. 1 percent of county general revenues
exception.11 The most common form of renationwide in 1971-72, while they were the
gional taxation is the countywide sales tax.
source of 17.4 percent of municipal general
However, of the 25 states levying such
revenues. Intergovernmental aid to coun-taxes, only six make any provision for disties was 42. 1 percent of general revenues in
tribution among jurisdictions within the

1971-72, while intergovernmental aid to
county on a basis other than origin of

sales.12
cities was only 32.9 percent.7
The final step toward regional fiscal re- In sum then, historical experience would
sponsibility is the levying of general pursuggest that if politically acceptable repose taxes on a region wide basis. This step
gional solutions to the urban fiscal problem
can be accompanied by metropolitan goverare to be found, they are more likely to be in
nance or its revenues can be distributed
the form of special purpose areawide taxes,
among jurisdictions in the region.
and increased use of city government sales

and income taxation.
Metropolitan general purpose gover-

nance regardless of its inherent advantages
and disadvantages, is not likely to be aIII. THE CASE FOR REGIONALISM

major component of intergovernmental

fiscal reform in the near future. Histori-

The theoretical and practical pro and cons

cally, the experience with consolidations
of regional provision and financing of urban

services are well discussed in the literahas been scant and suburban voter opposi-

ture.13 The arguments in favor of an
tion has been strong.8 Apart from the politi-

cal opposition to consolidation from suburareawide financing mechanism are the inban residents in general, there are the
ternalizing of external effects, the capturenormous problems associated with multiing of scale economics, the reduction of exstate SMS A's. 9 There has, of course, been
penditure (service level) disparities, and
much more success with annexation in the
the capturing of the suburban tax base and
'newer' urban areas of the South and West.
its growth. The counter arguments are that
But in the Northeast and North Central
such schemes impose efficiency losses by
regions where city fiscal problems are mostreducing local control over the package of
services delivered; they are apt to be costly
and they may heighten the overall regres7 1972 Census of Governments, Vol. U, Government

Finances , No. 3: Finances of County Governments,
10 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Boundary and Annexa(Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.) 1974.
tion Survey, 1970-1973, (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.)

8 See Vincent Marando, "The Politics of Metropolitan 1975.
Reform," in Campbell and Bahl, State and Local Govbee Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
ernment: The Political Economy of Reform; and Daniel Relations, Regional Governance: Promise and PerforGrant, "Urban Needs and State Responses: Local Gov- mance, (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.) 1973, Chapter IV.
ernment Reorganization," in Alan K. Campbell, ed., The
12 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental RelaStates and the Urban Crisis, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: tions, Local Revenue Diversification, p. 47.
Prentice-Hall) 1970.
13 For a summary of this literature see Wallace Oates,
9 In 1973, 36 of the 266 SMSA's were multistate and 5 Fiscal Federalism, (New York: Harcourt Brace
of them extended into more than two states.
Jovanovich) 1972.
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ous public
services and different tax
sivity of the tax burden
distribution.
Inlevels
to finance
them, they
be accomoessence, these arguments
require
a cannot
choice
dated
in the
same taxing
and servicing
between local autonomy
and
equity;
alterjurisdiction
without
efficiency loss to one
natively, a compromise
such
asantwo-tier
or both preferred
groups. For example,solusuppose cengovernment may be the
city apartment
dwellers would
prefer to
tion.14 Let us examine tral
these
arguments
in-

taxof
themselves
to provide
ample public
dividually in the context
the taxing
alter-

park previous
space while suburban
residents with
natives identified in the
section.
private yards wouldrelated
prefer lower to
taxes and
We begin with the arguments
fewer parks.
In separate
jurisdictions, both
economic efficiency. Since
these
efficiency
satisty their preferences.
In a
questions are primarilygroups
expenditure
or service delivery issues, the
alternatives
regional tax
financing
system, central city resiare not treated separately
until
we parks
turn
tosuburdents would
get fewer
and/or
the question of tax and
banites
service
would pay
equity.
higher taxes. Alternatively, the inefficiency could take the form
Externalities
of suburban residents relocating outside the

boundaries of the taxing jurisdiction and
Benefit spillovers across jurisdictional

commuting farther to their daily activities.
lines are a legitimate justification for reThis could pose severe problems for the
gional financing. In the absence of a financmetropolitan area in the long-run. This aring mechanism which requires all service

gument against regional financing, howrecipients to pay their share of service

ever, suffers from the same shortcoming as
costs, too little of the service will be prothe previous two arguments in favor of revided, generating economic inefficiency.
although there is some eviThe problem with this argument in the gionalization:
case
dence that they do exist,15 these efficiency
of most public services is that the efficiency
losses resulting from externalities and costs
in- are not measurable with any degree of

deed the externalities themselves are ex-

confidence.

tremely difficult to measure. In practice,
Costs of Regionalization

therefore, it is difficult to use the concept of
The
externalities to justify regional taxation
infinal efficiency argument relating to

regional financing of public services is that
the face of generally strong opposition.
there is a leveling upward of services and
Scale Economies
compensation rates when consolidation ini-

To the extent that they exist, scale

tially occurs. There is some evidence for

economies are also a legitimate justification this argument,16 although there are too few
for regional consolidation of public services.examples for a definitive analysis. This
However, there is little evidence of scaleleveling upward may have two costs. First,
economies beyond those hardware functionsit may raise service levels and hence taxes
(sewers and water), which have long since about their preferred levels. This is the case
been consolidated in most metropolitan of the suburban residents in the previous
areas.
example. Second a leveling up of employee
compensation rates may not be accomThus, scale economies are in the same
category as externalities: they are theoreti-panied by concomitant increases in the qualcally valid, but they lack the empirical evi- ity or quantity of services received. In this
case, there may be a net loss of efficiency
dence necessary for policy application.
regardless of service level preferences.
Local Preferences
In sum, the efficiency arguments, both
The major efficiency disadvantage of re- for and against regionalization, are far too

gionalization stems from the nonexclusionary nature of public services. If two

15 Bruce Hamilton, Edwin Mills, and David Puryear,

groups of people within a region prefer dif-"The Tiebout Hypothesis and Residential Income

ferent levels or different mixtures of vari-

Segregation," in Edwin Mills and Wallace Oates, eds.,

Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Control (Lexington,
Mass.: D.C. Heath) 1975.

i 14 Committee for Economic Development, Reshaping 16 Roy W. Bahl, "Estimating the Equity and BudgetGovernment in Metropolitan Areas , (New York: Com- ary Effects of Financial Assumption," National Tax
Journal , March, 1976, pp. 54-72.
: mittee for Economic Development) 1970.

This content downloaded from
131.96.28.155 on Wed, 19 Oct 2022 19:14:52 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

332 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX

weak empirically to justify
$181 outside
a strong
central cities.
position
19 This per capit
on the issue on these difference,
grounds
alone.
Thus,
however,
does not
imply a 30 per
cent difference
in tax burdens. It overstates
we turn to the question
of equity.
The two basic equity
issues
related
tocity
the burden
difference
because the core
regionalization are fiscal
is likely
disparities
to export part of its
and
tax burden.
the A
overall regressivity substantially
of thegreater
taxportion
system.
of central city
These issues provide ataxes
somewhat
more
tanare levied directly
on business
firms
or on suburban
residents as
commuters or
gible basis for evaluating
regional
financing
of public services.
shoppers in the central city. At the same
time, these tax burden estimates under-

Fiscal Disparities

state the burden difference because income

and taxable capacity are greater in the subWhile measurement problems are
urban areas and because a larger share of
severe 17 and both data and analysis are
the income-generating activity in the city
dated, there apparently are marked differarea is likely to be (property) tax exempt.
ences between metropolitan city and subThe net result of these complications is a
urban areas in per capita expenditures, tax
disparity in tax burdens of undetermined
effort, and per capita aid flows. The availamagnitude. The 30 percent disparity in tax
ble evidence indicates that per person
receipts per capita strongly suggests the
noneducation spending and aid, and tax efexistence of a disparity in per capita tax
fort are all higher in central cities, and that
per person education spending and educa-burdens as well, but whether the burden
differential is greater or smaller than 30
tion aid are higher in suburbs.18
percent is not known.
The most frequently cited reasons for this
pattern of fiscal disparities are the uneven Whatever we conclude about disparities,

it is clear that regional taxation schemes
distribution of wealth between city and

will have a major impact on the distribution
suburban residents which leads to a greater
of tax burdens in the region. If central cities
(unused) capacity to finance in suburbs, and
the overburden of noneducational services
are forced to rely on their own resources,
the resulting increases in city sales and inon central city budgets. The latter is argued
come taxes will heighten the difference in
to lead to suburban spending for education
tax effort between city and suburb and will
at about 50-60 percent of the total budget
the tax burdens of city residents more
while core cities spend for education atraise
a
than suburban residents. This occurs berate of about 35 percent. Although more
recent data and estimates than the 1972
cause of a combination of inducements for
suburban
ACIR computations are not available,
the shopping,20 lower effective rates
trend between 1957 and 1972 does not
on suburban than city residents, and the
proportion of consumption in the
suggest any marked change in thisgreater
pattern.
city
by city residents. This alternative is
On the subject of city/suburb tax
effort
really
an increasing levy on a declining base
disparities, more work is necessary
before
the case for higher city effort is convincing.
and may have deleterious long run effects.
Ignoring for the moment the problems
In the short
of run, however, it may produce
substantial
new revenues for cities; for
defining "tax effort" and measuring
perexample,
sonal income disparities between city
andincome and sales taxes account for
suburb, Sacks and Callahan estimate
1972shares of the local budget in
major
Philadelphia,
New York, and Columbus.
per capita taxes at $235 in central cities
and
The increase in taxes which include commuters will provide increased funds which
17 The most important of these measurement prob- may reduce expenditure disparities but at
lems is the allocation of countywide expenditures bethe cost of greater tax burdens on the urban
tween central city and suburban areas. Most commonly,
this has been done by using a population allocator. For poor, and undesirable long run effects on
more discussion of this point, see Seymour Sacks and growth in the local economy.
John Callahan, "Central City Suburban Fiscal Disparity," Appendix to Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, City Financial Emergencies,
19 Sacks and Callahan, "Central City Suburban Fiscal
(Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.) 1973.
Disparity."
18 Sacks and Callahan, "Central City Suburban Fiscal 20 John L. Mikesell, "Central Cities and Sales Tax
Disparity."
Differentials," National Tax Journal (June, 1970).
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The alternative is to turn to area wide tax
duce metropolitan fiscal disparities. Dislevies distributed on an equalizing basis.parities offer a stronger case for fiscal re-

Here there is a potential for a substantial gionalization than the efficiency arguments,
reduction in metropolitan fiscal disparities.but they too, have important drawbacks as
The level of resources raised from a givena solution to the urban fiscal crisis.
percent yield can be substantially increased
Regressivity of the Tax System
if the suburban base is included. Thus, if

there is a distribution formula which diverts

If property and sales taxes are the most

funds to the core city, expenditure dis- likely focus for regional taxation, then re-

parities could be markedly equalized.
gional financing may very well increase the
The key to this reduction in disparities is overall regressivity of the local tax system
the distribution allocator. Origin of sales, by changing the mix of taxes used to finance
income earned, or population allocators are social expenditures. In particular, central
not good long-run solutions for the city be- cities rely more heavily on nonproperty

cause of the decentralization of economic

taxes than smaller suburban jurisdictions.
activity in metropolitan areas. Resident The
in- distribution formula for regional tax

come is not easily measured, though sharing
in
may also increase the system's

theory it would seem appropriate. The best
regressivity because central cities have excombination would be a per capita distribupenditure responsibilities which are disprotion adjusted for full value of taxable propportionately large relative to the usual diserty and numbers of families below some
tribution criteria of population, income, or
minimum income level. Such a scheme proorigin of sales. These responsibilities induces a decided equalizing of tax burdens
clude downtown and cultural activities
among the city and suburban jurisdictions
if serve the entire region (externalities)
which
the tax base is income. If the base is sales or
and a large proportion of low-income resiproperty, the burden (tax as a percent dents.
of
To the extent that regional tax fitaxable capacity) is likely to fall more heavnancing of public services is a substitute for
ily on the core city where consumption greater
and
state or federal aid to central cities
rent account for a larger fraction of personal
as a solution to the urban fiscal crisis, the
income.
regressivity of the overall tax system is inThis issue of the distribution formula for

creased still further.

regional tax base sharing raises an aspect of The net equity effect of regional sales or
fiscal disparities that is often overlooked.property taxation, then, is a likely increase
This is the existence of disparities among in the regressivity of the tax system accomindividuals as well as among jurisdictions. panied by a likely (small) decrease in central
These two types of disparity are related, of
city-suburban fiscal disparities. The net efcourse, but a system which equalizes per
fect on the tax burden of low-income central
capita tax burdens among jurisdictions but
city residents is not clear. Thus, the case for
stops short of metropolitan government
fiscal regionalization is ambiguous on equity
does not necessarily equalize tax burdens
grounds as well as on efficiency grounds, at
among individuals with the same income. In
least until we know a great deal more about
particular, central cities with a much larger
the magnitudes of these effects.
share of residents at or below poverty income levels may impose greater burdens onCapturing the Suburban Tax Base
these residents than suburban jurisdictions
In addition to the efficiency and equity
impose on their low income residents.
arguments, there is the question of the revAs noted above, only six states attempt enue yield of regional taxes. This question
any redistribution of county sales taxes,
has both efficiency and equity aspects since
and not all redistribute on an 'equalizing' it is related to the issue of the size of the
basis. Regional property tax sharing, as in
public sector. These aspects are thoroughly

Minneapolis, represents an attempt to

discussed in the literature 21 so we will

equalize tax burdens but the amounts infocus our discussion on the likely magnitude
volved are very small. There is little eviof the revenue "bonus" to the central city if
dence of areawide general purpose income
taxation. Thus, the most likely forms of re- 21 See Jesse Burkhead and Jerry Miner, Public Exgional taxation are those least likely to re- penditure , (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.) 1971.
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a regional financing systemthat
were
adopted.
it is a way
for the central city to retain
The basis for this argument
for its
regional
or recover
tax base. But under present
taxation is the capture of the
wealthy
sub-this effect is not
forms
of regional taxation,

urban tax base and the potential
tax
accomplished.
Cityrevcommuter and sales
enues associated with the growth of taxes do not touch the suburban shopping
economic activity in the suburbs. This center or manufacturing plant, though they

proposition depends on a substantial trend do pick up city workers and shoppers who
toward decentralization of population and have moved to the suburbs. Certainly in the
employment within metropolitan areas.
long run, these taxes offer no real contribuProbably nowhere better is such a trendtion to the urban fiscal problem.
exhibited than in New York City. Indeed,
Consider, for example, the case of shiftthis decentralization is in large part respon-ing the financing of a specified package of
sible for the depth of New York City's fiscalservices from a city property tax to a recrisis. For example, between 1965 and gional sales tax. A recent case study in At1972, New York City experienced a net loss lanta 26 demonstrates that such an adjustof just over 4,200 jobs while its suburbsment would raise aggregate tax liabilities in
gained more than 348,000 jobs. In percent-the central city and increase the tax burden

age terms, New York City lost about 0.1at all income levels. This results in part

percent of its employment base while the because of a switch from a property tax,

suburbs increased their employment bymuch of which is paid by firms which export
16.3 percent. If Essex County which in-it outside the region, to a direct personal
cludes the city of Newark, and Hudsontax which cannot be exported.
County which includes Jersey City, are If, on the other hand, the proceeds of this

excluded from the suburban growth figures, tax are redistributed on a needs basis then

the growth rate of New York City's sub- there will likely be favorable incidence efurbs rises to 21.9 percent.22
fects on the expenditure side. This concluThis pattern of decentralization is not re-sion, however, must be qualified by the pos-

stricted to New York City. Population sibility that the availability of additional
growth in central cities of SMSA's grewfunding will merely bid up the level of city
only 6.4 percent between 1960 and 1970 employee wages and have little by way of
while their suburbs grew 26.8 percent.23an effect on real benefits.

Jobs also suburbanized in other metropoli-

The final irony in the capture of regional

tan areas, although the available data aretax base growth is that the most likely

not as comprehensive since they are availa- geographic area for regional taxation is the
ble only for cities which are coterminous county and central counties of large SMS A's
with counties.24 Philadelphia and St. Louis, are themselves growing at a much slower
for example, both lost jobs between 1965rate than the newer suburbs farther away
and 1972 at a faster rate than New York from the central city. This point is well ilCity.25
lustrated by the growth rates of employ-

It is alleged that regional taxation is a

partial answer to this decentralization in

22 David Puryear and Roy W. Bahl, Economic Prob-

lems of a Mature Economy, (Syracuse, N.Y.: Met-

ropolitan Studies Program, Syracuse University) 1976.

23 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of the
Population , Population Characteristics, United States
Summary, (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.) 1971.

ment in a sample of 54 of the largest 72
SMSA's, excluding single county SMSA's
and New England SMSA's: central county

employment in these 54 SMSA's grew at an
average annual rate of 1.4 percent between
1967 and 1972, while employment growth

outside the central counties averaged 5.0

24 The Census publishes employment data by place of
residence, not place of employment. In fiscal terms, the

latter is much more important. The Bureau of Labor

Statistics collects employment data by place of employment but only for labor force areas which are roughly

analogous to SMSA's (except for the Middle Atlantic

Regional Office which gathers data on New York City).

Thus, city employment data are only available for

coterminous city-counties for which data are published
in County Business Patterns.
25 Puryear and Bahl, Economic Problems of a Mature
Economy, table 12.

26 David Sjoquist, Larry Schroeder, and William
Wilken, Shifting Public Service Functions:
Expenditure-Revenue Effects and Political Feasibility,
(Atlanta: Atlanta Urban Observatory) 1974. This study
along with the other urban observatory cases is summarized in Roy W. Bahl and Walter Vogt, Fiscal Cen-

tralization and Tax Burden: State and Regional Finance of City Services (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger)
1975.
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percent annually during
this
period.27
up service
and
wage levels at least parti
Furthermore, fiscal disparities
appear toof
be
offset the internalization
spillover effe
as severe between these 54 central counties
and the economies of regional scale so t

and the rest of their SMSA's as for central

the effects of regional financing on

cities. Noneducation expenditure per capita
economically efficient provision of pub
for the central county areas (including allservices are not clear. The relative regr
local governments) was $336 in 1972 while it
si vity of local tax systems, especially
was only $215 in the rest of the SMSA's. suburban
A
jurisdictions, also partially offs
large part of both the growth differential
any potential decrease in central city
and the fiscal disparities can be attributed
suburban disparities in tax and expenditu
to the presence of the central cities in these
burdens, so that the equity implications
central counties, but the point of our arguregional financing are also unclear. In a
ment is that the noncentral city portion of
case, the regionalization of sales or prop
the counties is neither large enough nor
erty taxes is not likely to reduce dispari
wealthy enough to solve the central city
among income classes very much if at a
fiscal problem singlehandedly.
regardless of the interjurisdictional imp
The evidence strongly suggests that theof these taxes. Finally, there does not a
trend toward decentralization of economic
pear to be sufficient revenue capacity in
activity in urban areas affects the long-run
central counties of many large SMSA's t
viability of the central county tax base as
generate the magnitude of fiscal help
well as the central city tax base. It indicates
needed to solve the urban fiscal crisis. Th
that any fiscal dividend to central cities
we conclude that in their most likely for
from countywide taxes will be relatively
regional financing mechanisms will not
small and hardly of sufficient magnitude adequate
to
to deal with the fiscal problems

deal with the urban fiscal crisis.

large central cities and indeed may ev

exacerbate them. This gloomy forecast is
odds with the prevailing opinion of ma
urban
who fail to distingui
The outlook for regional financing
as ovservers
a
among
the forms of regionalization. Unf
solution to the serious fiscal problems
facing
tunately
it is precisely the most likely for
many of our large central cities
appears
regional financing that offer the least
rather dim. Among the available of
regional
terms
of benefits. Although many questi
options regarding tax bases and tax
jurisremain to be answered, other solutions su
dictions, countywide sales or property
asused
increased
federal or state aid, federal
taxes seem to be the most widely
at
stateto
assumption
of greater functional
the present time and the most likely
be
and full-fledged metropolit
adopted in the future. These twosponsibility,
forms of
government
may be more equitable an
regional finance do not provide an
unmitieven more efficient response to
gated blessing - even for thoseperhaps
they are
fiscal
woes of large central cities.
supposed to help most. The loss
of local
autonomy and the potential cost of leveling
IV. CONCLUSION

27 U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, 1973, (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.) 1974.
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